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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
Goodman Oil Company (" Appellant") is appealing the dismissal of Respondents 
Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., and Bart and Alane McKnight ("Respondents") as 
defendants in a writ of mandate and judicial review proceeding brought by the Appellant 
against the City of Nampa. 
Appellant contends that Respondents breached an agreement to vacate First 
Avenue South in Nampa, Idaho, when Respondents revoked their agreement to the 
vacation and communicated such revocation to the Nampa City Mayor. The Nampa City 
Mayor subsequently attempted to retroactively veto the ordinance vacating First Avenue 
South that had already been passed by the Nampa City Council. Appellant sought a writ 
of mandate against the City of Nampa and the Nampa City Mayor to force the City of 
Nampa to enact the vacation ordinance. Appellant did obtain a writ of mandate forcing 
the City of Nampa to vacate First Avenue South, however, the district court dismissed 
Appellant's claims against Respondents. 
2. Relevant Proceedings Below. 
Appellant filed its Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition for Judicial Review 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 on October 5, 2004. Included as defendants in 
those actions were the Respondents. On October 21, 2004, the Respondents moved to be 
dismissed from the case on the basis that neither the Writ of Mandate nor the Petition for 
Judicial Review stated a cause of action against Respondents. In response, the Appellant 
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made two motions to amend its action to include actions for breach of contract and 
tortious interference with contract against Respondents. On June 29, 2005, the district 
court denied Appellant's Motions to Amend and granted Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
The case against the City and Mayor of Nampa, however, continued. The 
Appellant prevailed in its Petition for Writ of Mandate and the district court issued the 
writ commanding the City of Nampa to vacate First Avenue South on July 20, 2005. 
The court issued its Memorandum Decision on Judicial Review and Order regarding 
Appellant's Petition for Judicial review on November 7, 2006. This order corrected the 
ordinance vacating First Avenue South and remanded to the City of Nampa the issue of 
whether other factors concerning the "public good" existed as to why vacate First A venue 
South had been vacated. The City of Nampa issued on January 25, 2007, its Notice of 
Public Hearing, which scheduled a public hearing for February 5, 2007, to consider 
whether First Street South in Nampa was to be vacated. 
In reaction, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification, 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Shorten Time on January 29, 2007. 
The Appellant claimed that the City of Nampa was violating the district court's Order of 
November 7, 2006, by deciding to hold a new public hearing on whether to vacate First 
Avenue South and claimed that the November 7, 2006, Order of the court was improper 
in its ambiguous remand of the case back to the City of Nampa. 
The district court issued on April 26, 2007, an order, which granted in part 
Appellant's Motion for Clarification that specifically limited the scope of the remand to 
the City of Nampa to the issue of only what the public good was that supported the 
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vacation of First Avenue South. The Appellant and the City of Nampa subsequently 
settled all issues between them. However, Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal against 
the dismissal of Respondents on June 6, 2007, which was refilled on January 1, 2008, 
under order from this Court to account for the fact the Appellant had settled with the City 
ofNampa. 
After the appeal was filed, the Respondents moved pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 32 for involuntary dismissal under the theory that Appellant's Notice of Appeal was 
late. The Respondents asserted in their motion that the November 7, 2006, Order was the 
final order from which the time for appeal ran. The Respondents failed to inform the 
Court in its motion about the four months of litigation that occurred after the November 
7, 2006, Order and failed to tell the Court about the April 26, 2007, order. On February 
11, 2008, this Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and stated only issues related to 
the April 26, 2007, Order could be appealed. The Appellant made a Motion for 
Reconsideration, arguing that this Court's order splitting a continuous case for purposes 
of appeal violated the basic tenets of civil procedure and had no basis in law. This Court 
granted Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and this appeal went forward. 
3. Factual Background. 
This dispute arises out of proceedings to vacate the public right-of-way of First 
Avenue South located between Blocks 16 and 19 of the City of Nampa, Canyon County, 
Idaho. 
On August 2, 1995, Appellant entered into a contract with Respondents, the 
Blamires Family Trust, and T.J. Forest, Inc. (other adjacent property owners). The 
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contract is entitled Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (hereafter "Vacation 
Agreement"). See R., p. 21. In the Vacation Agreement, the parties exchanged mutual 
promises consenting to the City of Nampa's vacation of First Avenue South as public 
right-of-way. Also pursuant to the Vacation Agreement, the parties granted and 
conveyed among themselves a perpetual easement upon the vacated property for the 
purpose of access to and from their property. The parties also agreed to fully cooperate 
to ensure that the purpose and intent of the Vacation Agreement was accomplished and to 
equally share in the maintenance of the easement in proportion to the amount of property 
they owned which adjoins First Avenue South. 
On August 3, 1995, Appellant submitted an application to the City for vacation of 
First Avenue South. On September 5, 1995, a public hearing was held and the Nampa 
City Council (the "Council") approved the vacation of First Avenue South between 2nd 
Street South and 3rd Street South. See R., p. 27. On September 18, 1995, the first 
reading of the Ordinance vacating First A venue South was completed by the Council. On 
October 2, 1995, the second reading of the Ordinance was completed by the Council. On 
October 16, 1995, the third reading of the Ordinance was tabled by the Council because 
the necessary approval by the Nampa Fire Department had not yet been obtained. 
Between 1995 and 2004, Appellant had offers and contracts to sell its real 
property adjacent to First A venue South. In 1999 and 2001, Appellant inquired of the 
City regarding the status of the vacation of First A venue South. The Planning Director 
for the City of Nampa confirmed that the vacation of First Avenue South between 2nd 
Street South and 3rd Street South had been approved by the Council on September 5, 
1995. 
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The vacation application never lapsed during the time period between Appellant's 
initial application and its final approval, indeed it was a subject of continual inquiry and 
review by Appellant and the City of Nampa. 
In July, 2004, Appellant and Mr. James R. Wylie (Wylie) signed a Purchase and 
Sale Agreement whereby Appellant agreed to sell its property adjacent to First A venue 
South to Wylie. The sale price was Six Hundred Thousand ($600,000) Dollars to be paid 
in cash at closing. The sale was contingent upon the City of Nampa completing the 
vacation of First Avenue South. Appellant contends that both Brad Blamires and 
Respondents had knowledge of this transaction and knowledge that the transaction was 
contingent on the successful vacation of First A venue South. 
On August 4, 2004, the Nampa Fire Department provided written conditional 
approval of development plans for the vacated property and the property owned by 
Appellant. The Nampa Fire Department approved the vacation of First A venue South 
subject to a dedicated twenty (20) foot wide fire apparatus access road. R., p. 30. 
The vacation of First Avenue South was then presented to the Council for 
passage. On August 16, 2004, the vacation ordinance ("Ordinance #3374") was 
approved by the Council and the Mayor. R., p. 31. Yet the Ordinance approved by the 
City Council reserved a fifty (50) foot easement instead of a twenty (20) foot easement 
recommended by the Nampa Fire Department. On the same day, the Mayor signed 
Ordinance #3374 and the City Clerk attested his signature. At that Council meeting, the 
Mayor declared Ordinance #3374 passed and directed the City Clerk to record it as 
required by law. The Mayor then relinquished possession and control of the approved 
Ordinance to the City Clerk. 
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On or about August 17, 2004, the City Clerk delivered Ordinance No. 3374 to the 
Idaho Press Tribune with instructions that the Ordinance be published on August 23, 
2004. However, sometime after August 17, 2004, but prior to August 23, 2004, the City 
Clerk contacted the Idaho Press Tribune and cancelled the request to publish Ordinance 
#3374. On September 2nd, Mayor Tom Dale vetoed Ordinance #3374. 
After the Ordinance was passed, Respondent Bart McKnight, President of 
Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., made contact with the Mayor and the Nampa City 
Attorney, Mr. White, to voice Respondent Duro-Bilt's objections to the Ordinance. 
Through these ex parte contacts, Mr. McKnight was able to cause Ordinance # 3374, 
which had already been passed, to be vetoed.1 
Respondent McKnight's efforts to interdict Ordinance #3374 began with speaking 
with a Nampa City Clerk and telling the City Clerk he no longer consented to the 
vacation of First Avenue South and wished to prevent Ordinance #3374 from going into 
effect. The City Clerk directed Respondent McKnight to call the City Attorney, Mr. 
White. Respondent McKnight called the City Attorney that same day and voiced his 
objections to Ordinance #3374. Respondent McKnight stated at his deposition that Mr. 
White advised McKnight that, "they could withdraw this if I talked to the mayor." 
Respondent McKnight then, again that same day, called Nampa City Hall, spoke to 
Mayor Dale, and explained his objection to the vacation. Mayor Dale agreed to veto 
Ordinance #3374. Respondent McKnight specifically recalled this exchange in his 
1 
It should be noted, Respondent McKnight's objection to Ordinance No. 3374 was aided by the 
fact he is a mend of Mayor Dale. Respondent McKnight and the Mayor have participated in various civic 
activities and events together. The Mayor has taught Mr. McKnight's children. McKnight and the Mayor 
have mutual friends, specifically the Nampa City Counsel member Mr. Martin Thorne. Mr. McKnight and 
the Mayor went on a ski trip together to Sun Valley in March of 2004. The Mayor Dales himself has 
described Bart McKnight as a mend. 
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deposition testimony: "I asked him [the Mayor] if there was a way to pull this off of 
being published, and he said, 'Yes, I can veto it."' 
Once learning of Mayor Dale's veto, the Appellant immediately wrote to the 
Mayor on September 3rd and the Council in an effort to save the transaction with Wylie. 
Appellant later argued to the Mayor and Nampa City Council at the September 20, 2004, 
City Council meeting that the Mayor did not have authority to veto Ordinance #3374 
after he had fully approved the Ordinance. Appellant told the Mayor and Council that it 
would file a Petition for Writ of Mandate if the City refused to amend and publish 
Ordinance No. #3374. However, the Mayor and Council refused to override the Mayor's 
veto and publish Ordinance #3374. As a result, Goodman's transaction with Wylie 
failed. 
Goodman subsequently filed its Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition for 
Judicial Review. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Notice of Appeal in that case raises the following issues: 
a. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Respondents as a 
defendant; 
b. Whether the District Court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to 
Amend its Petition for Writ of Mandate to include causes of action 
against Respondents; and, 
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c. Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees 
as a result ohhis appeal. 
III. 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
This case comes to the Court on review of an order granting the Respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Court's 
standard of review for an order of the district court dismissing a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) is the same as the summary judgment standard of review. See Coghlan v. Beta 
Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,398,987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999); see also Orthman v. 
Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995). After viewing aJI facts 
and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask 
whether a claim for relief has been stated. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 398, 987 P.2d at 310. 
"The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 
'entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.' "Id, citing Orthman 126 Idaho at 962, 
895 P.2d at 563, quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 
L.Ed.2d 90, 96 (1974) (citation omitted). 
"The denial of a plaintiffs motion to amend a complaint to add another cause of 
action is governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review." Estate of Becker v. 
Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623, 628 (2004) (quoting Thomas v. Medical 
Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 557, 567 (2002)). An "abuse of 
discretion" standard requires this Court to inquire as to: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
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boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and, (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 
1000 (1991). 
IV. 
THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN DISMISSED 
Respondents asserted that they should be dismissed as a party/respondent before 
the district court because the Appellant did not seek any remedy against them; and thus, 
Appellant's action against Respondents could not succeed under any set of facts. The 
District Court agreed and under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissed the Respondents from the 
case. See R., pp. 82-84. 
Appellant contends that this was error because Respondents were indispensable 
parties to the lawsuit. I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l) provides that a party shall be joined if: 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest. 
See I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l)(emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "Whether or not a party is indispensable to 
an action depends largely upon the relief sought." Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 
95 Idaho 881, 896, 522 P.2d 1102, 1117 (1974). In Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot 
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Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286,292,688 P.2d 1191, 1197 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals listed three purposes behind Rule 19: to · protect the absentee from 
prejudice resulting from the judgment, to protect the parties from harassment by 
successive suits and to advance judicial economy. 
Respondents are clearly an indispensable party. Respondents are an adjoining 
First Avenue South property owner. If Appellant were successful in obtaining a Writ of 
Mandate causing Ordinance #3374 to be published, then First Avenue South would have 
been vacated (and indeed was). Respondents' property would have then by way of J.C.§ 
50-311 accreted one-half the vacated property (and indeed did). Respondents' lot 
adjoining First A venue South consists of 2,800 square feet. Respondents' lot increased in 
size by an additional 2,000 square feet upon vacation of the street. Without question, 
Respondents had an interest in the subject matter of the action that necessitated its 
participation in order for that interest to be protected. 
Further, Ordinance #3374 reserved what was determined by the district court to 
be an inappropriate fifty (50) foot wide access and utility easement. See R., pp at 108-
109. The easement encumbered the west side of the vacated property. The west side is 
the Respondents' side. Respondents also had an interest in either preserving its existing 
access and utility easements or participating in revising the description of the access and 
utility easements as reserved in the ordinance. Again, Respondents had an interest in the 
subject matter of the action that necessitated its participation in order for that interest to 
be protected. 
This case also presented issues concerning Respondents' ex parte contacts with 
Mayor Dale following approval of the Ordinance #3374. Mayor Dale's "veto" of 
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Ordinance #3374 and the basis of this whole action is the direct result of Respondents' 
belated objection to the vacation of First Avenue South. See Reporter's Transcript of 
July 15, 2005, hearing, p. 39, Ins. 9-13. Respondents' role in the case went beyond being 
mere witnesses to being involved parties to the case. The Respondents instigated the 
decision by the City of Nampa and its mayor to engage in unlawful conduct at the 
expense of Appellant. Respondents were the ones ultimately responsible for Appellant 
filing its Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition for Judicial review. The Respondents 
were necessary and indispensable parties, and the district court was in error to summarily 
dismiss them. 
V. 
APPELLANT SHOULD HA VE BEEN ALLOWED TO 
AMEND ITS CAUSES OF ACTION 
As this Court knows, after a responsive pleading has been served "a party may 
amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires .... " LR.C.P. 15(a). In Family Trust 
v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court 
summarized the standard for amendment of pleadings: 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue 
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the 
leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 11 
Id at 871, 993 P.2d at 1203 quoting Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272, 
561 P.2d 1299 (1977) and Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
Appellant sought to add claims of breach of contract and tortious interference of 
contract to the action for writ of mandate and action for judicial review against 
Respondents. The district court correctly noted that leave to amend must be freely given. 
Yet the district court denied Appellant's motions to amend on the basis that adding such 
matters would "add a multitude of new issues, would add new parties, and would delay 
resolution of the critical question; that is the validity of the ordinance that Mayor Dale 
purportedly vetoed .... " See Reporter's Transcript of May 20, 2005, hearing, p. 30, Ins. 
1-4. The court's denial of Appellants motion was explicitly based upon the case of 
Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho 993, 895 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1995). However, Hinkle v. 
Winey does not support the district court's decision. 
In Hinkle v. Winey, the district court denied a motion made prior to trial to add 
causes of action for unlawful entry, assault, battery, conversion, false imprisonment and 
wrongful possession to an action to compel the conveyance of real property pursuant to 
an alleged contract of sale. In affirming the district court's denial of the motion to 
amend, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
The amendment sought by the Hinkles was to state causes of 
action based upon events that occurred a year or more after the 
events giving rise to formation of the disputed agreement that was 
the subject of the original complaint and counterclaim. The 
evidence that would be offered on the proposed new claims would 
be entirely different from that necessary for the original causes of 
action. The proposed amendment would have added parties and 
opened up new avenues of discovery, almost certainly requiring a 
delay of the trial. In addition, there has been no showing of any 
prejudice to the Hinkles from the district court's determination that 
the new issues would best be resolved in a separate action. 
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Finally, I.R.C.P. 18(a) allows Appellant to join "as many claims" as Appellant has 
against the opposing parties, and I.R.C.P. 20(a) allows the Appellant to join multiple 
defendants if there is asserted against them a right to relief "arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of 
law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action." As stated, Respondents 
conduct was what instigated the illegal action on the part of the City of Nampa and its 
mayor. The breach of the Vacation Agreement by Respondents in soliciting the Mayor of 
Nampa to retroactively veto the street vacation was at the heart of the proposed causes of 
action and the action for the writ of mandate. The Respondents and the City of Nampa 
acted in concert when they succeeded in illegally vetoing the vacation ordinance. 
The Appellant was entitled to amend its cause of action to include contract and 
tort claims against the Respondents. The district court cited no reason based in actual 
fact not to allow the amendment and thus abused its discretion. 
VI. 
THE DISTRICT COURT A WARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS MUST BE VACATED 
After dismissing the Respondents from the case and denying Appellant's Motions 
to Amend, the district court awarded Respondents $9,332.49 attorneys' fees pursuant to 
LC. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54 and $962.49 in costs as a matter of right under I.R.C.P. 54. 
R., p. 89. If the Appellant prevails on any of the issues presented for appeal, then this 
award for costs and attorney's fees must be vacated as the Respondents could no longer 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 14 
be seen as the prevailing party under I.R.C.P. 54 and as Appellant's case could no longer 
be seen as frivolous. 
Further, even if Appellant does not prevail on the above issues, the Court is 
obligated to vacate the award of attorney fees for two reasons. First, if a court is to award 
fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54, the court must under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) 
"make a written finding, either in the award or separate document, as to the basis and 
reasons for awarding such attorney fees." No such writing or document was ever entered 
by the district court. Under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) a party is entitled to a written explanation 
as to why its case has been found to have been frivolous. The district court did not 
explain why it found so and the award must be vacated by this Court. See Black v. 
Young, 122 Idaho 302,834 P.2d 304 (1992). 
Second, the award of fees should be vacated on the basis that Appellant's claims 
were not frivolous. "An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is appropriate where 
a party's claim or defense is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Kiebert v. 
Goss, 144 Idaho 225, ----, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). There was a reasonable foundation 
to have Respondents named in the action against the City of Nampa. As stated, the 
Respondents were the instigators of the legal quagmire Appellant had to fight through in 
order to accomplish the vacation of First Avenue South. Further, the Respondents had a 
critical interest in the subject matter of the litigation as adjoining property owners. They 
were indispensable parties to the litigation. The district court refused to keep them in the 
case and litigate the contract claims against them merely for the convenience of the court 
and not in accord with any principle of law. Appellant's actions thus are not frivolous. 
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VII. 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
If Appellant prevails on any issues on appeal, it is entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs as the prevailing party under LC. § 12-120(3). "The critical test is whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial 
transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is 
attempting to recover." Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 
506, 515 (1993). The basis of Appellant's inclusion of Respondents in the action against 
the City of Nampa and Appellant's contract actions that Appellant attempted to bring in 
to the case were based upon the Vacation Agreement entered into between Appellant and 
Respondents. The Vacation Agreement is an enforceable contract, and the Respondents 
intentionally breached it, causing the Mayor of Nampa to illegally and retroactively veto 
the ordinance vacating First A venue South. The breach of the Vacation Agreement is the 
foundation up which this entire case rests and thus LC. § 12-120(3) applies. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents knowingly and willing entered into the Vacation Agreement to 
vacate First A venue South. When Appellant sought to effectuate the Vacation 
Agreement and have First Avenue South in fact vacated, the Respondents intentionally 
sabotaged Appellant's work. Respondents breached the Vacation Agreement and forced 
Appellant to engage in three years of litigation against the City and Mayor of Nampa to 
undue Respondents' subterfuge. Respondents conduct in this regard was the root of 
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Appellant's action against the City of Nampa. It was entirely proper and necessary that 
Respondents be included in the actions against the City of Nampa, and the district court 
abused its discretion not allowing all relevant claims, including the contract claims 
against Respondents, to be heard all at once. 
DATED this 22nd day of May 2008. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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The undersigned hereby certified that on this 22nd day of May 2008, a true and 
correct copy of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF was served upon opposing counsel as 
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Tammy Zokan 
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950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
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